The IDF General Staff, presided over by Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir, held a special session on Monday devoted to a full strategic review of security challenges facing Israel. Such an in-depth session had not taken place in around two years.

Some of the most important conclusions from the session were that all of Israel’s borders must have a built-in buffer zone from now on.

So far, Israel has accomplished this in the Gaza Strip, Syria, and Lebanon.

There is less of a clear buffer zone with Egypt and Jordan, although Jerusalem has peace with those two countries.

In addition, aspects of the 1978 Egypt-Israel Camp David Accords still keep in check Egyptian military deployment near the border.

Police at the scene where three Israelis were killed in a terror shooting attack at Allenby bridge, a crossing between West Bank and Jordan, September 8, 2024
Police at the scene where three Israelis were killed in a terror shooting attack at Allenby bridge, a crossing between West Bank and Jordan, September 8, 2024 (credit: YONATAN SINDEL/FLASH90)

Jordan has a much smaller and less potentially threatening military, and the Jordan Valley forms somewhat of an additional buffer zone for much of Israel, while not protecting small Israeli villages there.

Both Egypt and Jordan have also seen small-scale penetrations into Israel of smugglers or terrorists.

Offense is best form of defense, IDF decides

The military also said, unlike before the October 7 massacre, it would achieve most of its defensive needs by preemptive offense.

Currently, IDF forces in Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon periodically attack potentially hostile forces to prevent them from reconstituting the larger threats they posed before the war.

In addition, the military decided that in the future, various definitions for success should be set for different fronts and enemies.

For example, if prior to October 7, 2023, it was believed that there was no way to decisively beat any of Israel’s enemies, and the best the IDF could do was low-scale fighting to reset deterrence, the military now has hit all of its enemies harder but not at the same level and not with the same goal.

Currently, the IDF’s goal is to completely disrupt any military rehabilitation by Hamas in Gaza.

In contrast, the IDF is not trying to completely eliminate Hezbollah as a military force in Lebanon; it is trying to keep it completely out of southern Lebanon and is keeping the pressure on it from organizing large-scale or more threatening military activities even deeper into Lebanon.

In Syria, the IDF is trying to keep Syrian military forces out of a buffer zone and is picking and choosing select moments to intervene deeper into Syria regarding military issues, such as during part of the ongoing internal Syrian battle between the Druze and other Syrians.

Long-term policies will also need to be set for Yemen’s Houthis, as well as for how to handle Iran after the June 13-24 war.

Significant aspects of these policies will be handled by new IDF Depth Corps Commander Maj.-Gen. Dan Goldfus, who as a field commander took over Khan Yunis in 2023-2024.