The ongoing crisis in southern Syria, centered on the Druze community, has effectively disrupted any potential Israeli cooperation with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.
In an interview with Maariv, Prof. Amatzia Baram said that Israel’s interest in forging ties with Damascus is now in direct conflict with its obligation to protect the Druze minority.
“This doesn’t add up,” said Baram, a Middle East expert at the University of Haifa, describing the gap between security cooperation talks and the recent violence. “The development of talks on Israeli-Syrian security cooperation is now facing a major obstacle – the Druze issue.”
The turning point, Baram explained, came when Syrian regime forces carried out a surprise assault on Druze communities in Sweida and the Jabal al-Druze region. What began as a localized dispute between Bedouin and Druze groups escalated into a broader strategic test. Now, can Israel trust Syria’s emerging leadership?
“This latest crisis,” Baram said, “exposes the deep internal contradictions of post-Assad Syria. There’s no doubt that Sharaa wants to work with the West – and with us, too. He badly needs it.” Western and Gulf powers, he noted, could play a key role in salvaging Syria’s devastated economy.
From Israel’s perspective, there had been a real opportunity to coordinate with Sharaa, primarily against Hezbollah. “Sharaa is presenting the image of a moderate leader,” Baram noted. “As of today, the reality on the ground is entirely different.”
Druze refusal to disarm provokes conflict
At the heart of the conflict lies Druze opposition to regime control. “The problem between the Druze and Sharaais that most Druze refuse to hand over their light and medium weapons to the regime, and don’t want armed regime units in their areas – for example, in Sweida.”
“The regime demands full control,” he continued. “Though until now it had backed down from enforcing it. But now, perhaps because Bedouins (who are Sunnis) and other Sunni jihadists attacked the Druze, Sharaa, or senior generals under him, see an opportunity to impose Damascus’s full control over the Druze towns.”
Still, Baram raised questions about command authority.
“Even if Sharaa himself isn’t a jihadist – and that’s still an open question – he is surrounded by them, including some of his top commanders. Is it possible that parts of the army acted without presidential approval? Sharaa’s office said he’s against harming civilians and promised to punish those responsible, but it didn’t announce that the president opposes the military action itself. And you can’t send armored forces dozens of kilometers south of Damascus without the involvement of the Syrian general staff.
“So, who gave the order? Was it Sharaa himself, or did his commanders act on their own – in which case, does he have any control over his forces? Perhaps he sent forces to end the clashes, but his jihadist troops exploited the opportunity to massacre Druze. If that’s the case, then clearly he has no control over them. All the options are very bad,” Baram said.
The Druze Community and Israel's obligation
Baram emphasized that the Druze have long been part of Syria’s social and political fabric. “The Druze always fought against us alongside Assad in every war,” he said. “Because they see themselves as Syrians.”
But after Assad was totally removed from power, the Druze were exposed to new threats.
“They are vulnerable to threats from Sunni residents in the area – Bedouins, ISIS, and others.”
Zooming out, Baram painted a broader picture of instability.
"Syria is divided. In the Alawite coastal region, Sharaa barely holds control. In the Turkish-controlled north, he doesn’t have full control either, but the Turks support him, so he isn’t worried there.
“There’s the Kurdish zone in northeast Syria, where Sharaa has no control, and another area stretching from south of the Euphrates to the Syrian-Jordanian border, from Deir ez-Zor in the east to the Golan. This is a desert area with lots of sheep – and a mix of armed factions, each posing a different challenge for Sharaa.”
Baram added that Sweida is about 80 kilometers from the Israeli border. “They’re part of that chaotic region. The regime has only partial control there, and the Druze are part of the problem. Because they are not militarily strong, the regime may have decided this was the moment to impose its rule over them.”
Israel at a moral, strategic crossroads
Baram described a fundamental strategic bind for Israel. “Israel genuinely wants to coordinate and cooperate with Sharaa, and for good reasons – both from our perspective and his. We share common enemies.
“But we have an obligation to the Druze – and not because the Syrian Druze are pro-Israel. They’re not. But we have a commitment to them because they have brothers in Israel who serve in the IDF, and they are proud and loyal Israeli citizens. We are committed to them.”
He added that Islamist extremism poses a deeper threat to these communities.
“Islamists harbor deep hatred toward the Druze. To extremist Islamists like Islamic State (ISIS), people who are Druze, Alawites, and Shi’ites are all viewed as Muslims who left the faith, meaning traitors to Islam, and therefore deserve death.”
“You can’t eliminate the Shi’ites – there are too many of them. But the Druze and Alawites, being small communities, are more vulnerable. Sharaa is surrounded by people who – and it’s hard for me to say this – would like to slaughter them.”
Baram stressed that Israel is unlikely to launch a military campaign. “Israel won’t invade southern Syria. Period. We’ve got enough wars already – and Gaza is an open wound.”
However, he added, limited action is possible. “Israel can help – through tank fire, combat helicopters, very limited ground action – all to hit any target aiming to stop government forces and militias, and to protect the Druze. It complicates things for us, but we have no choice but to do so. We can’t allow a Druze massacre.”
Even though a ceasefire was announced Wednesday, and a senior Druze figure reported that the Syrian army had withdrawn, Baram said the danger remains high. “The danger remains. Ceasefires in our region are merely a suggestion.”
Baram argued that the best political solution might involve limited autonomy. “As a first step, for example, the Syrian army should leave for good, but regime police units with light arms could patrol Druze areas. Ideally, young local Druze would volunteer for the police, wear Syrian uniforms to symbolize unity, and patrol Sweida. That arrangement would calm the Druze and show Damascus sovereignty.”
He also advocated diplomatic pressure. “Politically, Baram says the Trump administration should be enlisted to threaten renewed sanctions unless Sharaa changes course. The economic issue carries a lot of weight.”
Ultimately, Baram said the crisis reveals the limits of political realism in the Middle East.
“While Israel and Damascus both want security understandings, mainly against Hezbollah, the situation on the ground is harsh, even toxic. Islamist religious hatred of the Druze and Alawites runs deep and is tied to painful memories from the civil war.”
“It’s important to remember that most Druze don’t like Israel. Not all of them want us to intervene – unless it’s really about saving lives. Most Druze still see themselves as Syrians, and some of them, even now, support Damascus.”
“Can [Israel] balance the need to build bridges and ties with the new regime in Damascus with its obligations to the Druze? Should it continue trying to engage with Sharaa, or see him as a Syrian Sinwar?" Baram concluded.
"The answers to these and related questions will impact not only the Druze in Syria, Sharaa's regime, and Israel’s moral and diplomatic standing and strength, but also the future stability of the region as a whole.”