Lebanon: Between escalation and strategic opportunity - opinion

A year after the ceasefire in Lebanon – and despite the hundreds of strikes carried out by Israel – Hezbollah has refrained from responding militarily, even though it retains residual capabilities north of the Litani and in the Beqaa Valley.

This restraint stems from three key considerations: an understanding that Israeli retaliation would be devastating; confidence that its rearmament efforts can continue despite Israeli activity; and concerns over losing internal legitimacy even more.

Against the backdrop of recent remarks by US envoy to Syria Tom Barack, who described Lebanon as a failed state incapable of dismantling Hezbollah, Israel’s defense establishment appears to have concluded that the group’s renewed military buildup cannot be stopped through limited airstrikes alone.

Given Iran’s ongoing efforts to restore Hezbollah’s capabilities by transferring funds, weapons, intelligence, and knowledge, Lebanon’s evolving reality may once again pose a major strategic threat to Israel – one that could necessitate a broad and decisive response.

Reports of Israeli interceptions of weapons transfer and smuggling of shipments along the Syria-Lebanon reflect likely attempts to revive the corridor linking Iran and Lebanon in an effort to bypass the Al-Sharaa regime’s tightening control over smuggling. It is reasonable to assume that additional shipments slip through undetected, especially as Hezbollah and Iran have learned from past failures and now operate with increased secrecy.

Even though the direct threat along the northern border  particularly a “Radwan Force” raid scenario – has diminished following Israel’s extensive strikes on Hezbollah’s southern infrastructure and the IDF’s control of border areas, this does not guarantee long-term calm.

Small-unit incursions or attacks by local actors against Israeli border communities remain a possibility. The unusual strike last week on a Hamas compound in the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp underscores the persistence of hostile activity against Israel by Palestinian factions as well, highlighting the need for Israel to direct attention not only toward Hezbollah but also toward other armed militias operating in Lebanon.

Still, the primary threat now stems from Hezbollah’s continued ability to fire rockets and missiles from farther north, especially from the Beqaa Valley and beyond, where its core military strength is concentrated.

Despite the inherent unpredictability of ideologically driven movements, Hezbollah’s current interest appears not to escalate but to quietly rebuild its military until it can surprise Israel with an operational offensive employing new methods and capabilities.

By the war’s end, Lebanese citizens recognized that Hezbollah had failed to protect its leaders, let alone the state it dragged into ruin. In August, the government formally resolved to disarm the organization. Hezbollah’s “resistance weapon,” once part of Lebanon’s official defense doctrine, was reclassified as a militia to be dismantled under the Taif Agreement, like all others before it.

This move sparked cautious optimism. Many Lebanese – including a growing number of Shi’ites – are weary of endless conflict and destruction. They now view Hezbollah as the force that imposed a disastrous war serving Iranian, not Lebanese, interests. Combined with mounting international pressure led by the United States, this sentiment has revived hopes that Lebanon can finally escape the cycle of violence and reassert state monopoly over arms.

For the first time in decades, there is a faint prospect of effective governance and, perhaps, even a long-term security agreement and political arrangement with Israel.

Most Lebanese do not want to see their country destroyed again or their citizens displaced. In their eyes, Hezbollah has lost credibility – and even its raison d’être as Lebanon’s defender – after its intervention in the Israel-Hamas War brought only ruin. The growing popular desire for real change reflects the wider realization that war with Israel serves no national purpose.

Yet, the Lebanese government’s weakness and the army’s limited capacity remain stark. While the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAS) have dismantled parts of Hezbollah’s infrastructure in coordination with the group, they are far from reestablishing control south of the Litani River, let alone north of it. Roughly 30 to 40% of Lebanese soldiers are Shi’ites, and some identify with Hezbollah or cooperate with it – passively or actively.

Hezbollah, meanwhile, is exploiting Israel’s strikes to justify retaining its weapons and to denounce any Lebanese dialogue with Israel. Reports of civilian casualties in some attacks have fueled public anger, and the Lebanese president recently instructed the army to “confront any Israeli incursion” into the south.

This creates a paradox. Israel’s strikes and forward positions inside Lebanon are a necessary security measure and perhaps even a lever for the Beirut government, with which to pressure Hezbollah to disarm. Yet, they also hand Hezbollah a pretext to cling to its weapons.

Lebanon is undergoing a historic shift due to Hezbollah’s postwar weakness. Yet the state still lacks the power to establish a true monopoly over arms, and Israeli strikes alone cannot prevent Hezbollah’s gradual military recovery.

Under these conditions, Israel must coordinate closely with the United States and regional partners to accelerate efforts to weaken Hezbollah while strengthening the Lebanese state and army. Only by doing both can the conditions for Hezbollah’s eventual disarmament be created.

Israel should not abandon the diplomatic track, which could yield the desired outcome – a state monopoly on arms – even if achieved gradually. After degrading Hezbollah’s capabilities and deterrence, Israel might consider a short, time-bound pause of several weeks to allow the Lebanese army to act in the south. Depending on the results on the ground, Israel could then determine its next steps.

As in nearly every regional issue, American resolve will determine success. Jerusalem must coordinate with Washington to intensify the pressure on Beirut so that it will fulfill its commitments. If the Lebanese government fails again, Israel should reaffirm with the US the legitimacy of further military action in Lebanon.

Simultaneously, Israel should urge the US and the Gulf states to link Lebanon’s reconstruction to Hezbollah’s disarmament – first south of the Litani and then nationwide. The Lebanese public, including Shi’ites, must understand that Hezbollah’s insistence on keeping its weapons blocks national recovery.

It should also ensure that reconstruction, particularly in the south, is led by pragmatic moderate Muslim actors, such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE — not Iran or Qatar. Riyadh has already conditioned its investment on Hezbollah’s disarmament and economic reforms, while Iran continues funding Hezbollah and southern communities, and Qatar pays Lebanese army salaries.

Israel must expand economic sanctions and pressure on Hezbollah and Iran, while giving the Lebanese government control over reconstruction aid to strengthen it ahead of the 2026 Lebanese elections.

Additionally, it must push Lebanon and Syria to settle the Shebaa Farms issue by returning the area to Syrian sovereignty, thus stripping Hezbollah of one of its key justifications for keeping arms.

The Jewish state must also put pressure on Ahmed Al-Sharaa’s regime to more effectively secure the Syria-Lebanon border against Iranian smuggling, a point that must be part of any future Israel-Syria arrangement. Hezbollah is counting on the Sharaa regime's weakening to allow renewed Iranian entrenchment in Syria and its use as a logistics hub.

Using non-Qatari funding, Israel must continue to strengthen and equip the Lebanese Armed Forces to make them a credible counterweight to Hezbollah under strict oversight to prevent arms diversion to the organization.

It must also launch talks with Beirut on the final demarcation of the international border with Israel.

Finally, Israel should pressure Lebanon to repeal its 1955 law prohibiting any contact between Lebanese and Israelis, which imposes prison sentences on violators.

After October 7, Israel will no longer tolerate the reemergence of a strategic threat along its borders. Israel’s updated security doctrine calls for preventive action before such a threat can materialize. Regular military operations — and, when necessary, broader offensives in Lebanon — remain viable instruments of policy.

Nevertheless, advancing Israel’s interests in Lebanon requires a careful balance of military pressure and diplomatic engagement. Israeli actions and messaging must maintain sustained pressure on Hezbollah, a militia whose weapons pull Lebanon toward ruin.

Hezbollah must, ultimately, be dismantled for the sake of stability and prosperity for both peoples.

And one more point, not directly related to Hezbollah: The Israeli government must urgently accelerate the reconstruction of the northern communities devastated by the war.

These border villages, kibbutzim, and towns form Israel’s first line of defense, yet they remain neglected and underfunded. True victory in the North will not come from disarming Hezbollah alone — it will come from a thriving, resilient Galilee.