Two years ago, Hezbollah was initially reluctant to enter the Israel-Hamas War, but it was gradually drawn deeper into the fighting until Israel shifted its main effort from Gaza toward its northern border, confronting the group directly.
Concentrating ground and air operations, Israel inflicted heavy losses on Hezbollah, particularly among its senior commanders and leadership figures, such as in Hassan Nasrallah’s close circle.
The campaign also dealt a significant blow to Hezbollah’s missile launch capabilities and unmanned aerial systems, while exposing deep intelligence penetrations into the organization’s ranks. These culminated in Operation Beepers, incapacitating thousands of Hezbollah operatives.
During the war between Israel and Hezbollah, the terror group’s military infrastructure near the Israeli border, including villages that had been transformed into terrorist strongholds over the years, suffered severe damage. This was the situation a year ago, when a ceasefire mediated by the United States, France, and other international actors came into effect, accompanied by a supervision and enforcement mechanism.
Political shift
Equally significant was the political shift inside Lebanon. A new government was formed under the leadership of former army commander Joseph Aoun, despite Hezbollah’s longstanding efforts to block such a move through its constitutional leverage as one-third of parliament.
The government set out to restore stability and governance across the country, adopting a landmark decision to recognize only one legitimate armed force, the Lebanese army. The implication was clear. The Lebanese Armed Forces would be tasked with collecting weapons and ultimately disarming Hezbollah.
This plan is ambitious, given the LAF’s limited resources, capabilities, and demographic composition, and is slated for completion by the end of 2025.
While the Lebanese army has begun the process of collecting weapons, it has largely avoided direct confrontations with Hezbollah. Overall, the pace of disarmament remains slower than the rate at which Hezbollah replenishes its arsenal, underscoring the scale of the challenge ahead.
In 2025, Hezbollah, under the comparatively subdued leadership of Qassem Naim, is grappling with a deep leadership crisis and mounting financial strain. Much of this stems from the way Iran, its principal patron, concluded the war and absorbed its damages. International sanctions have further weakened the movement, compounding its difficulties.
Concurrently, Hezbollah faces an internal identity crisis, particularly among the population of southern Lebanon, where the gap between pre‑war promises and the post‑war reality of destruction has left widespread frustration. With little capacity to compensate residents or rebuild villages destroyed by Israel, the organization’s credibility has eroded.
Nevertheless, Hezbollah has devoted significant resources to rapidly restoring its military capabilities both in southern Lebanon and deeper inland, even as it temporarily challenges the Lebanese government’s decision to disarm it and Israel’s efforts to prevent a return to the reality that existed prior to October 7, 2023.
Israel and possible scenarios
Israel, drawing one of the central lessons from the war, has adopted an aggressive prevention strategy built on sustained offensive operations. A year after the ceasefire, this policy is evident in hundreds of strikes across Lebanon and the elimination of roughly 350 Hezbollah operatives.
The approach has effectively redefined the notion of ceasefire, which in practice resembles “uninterrupted fire” carried out without significant response from Hezbollah. The pressing question now is how long such a policy can remain viable, and in which scenarios it may need to be adjusted or reconsidered.
- In the short term, Israel is likely to continue frequent, primarily aerial, targeted strikes without escalating into full-scale combat. This approach resembles the War Between the Wars Campaign conducted for years in Syria against Iranian entrenchment.
- A possible next step would be to intensify airstrikes and launch a series of attacks on Hezbollah infrastructure across Lebanon. Such a move could trigger a short campaign and would almost certainly provoke Hezbollah to retaliate against Israel.
- Another scenario involves combining airstrikes with limited ground maneuvers in villages near the border. This option would inevitably draw a strong Hezbollah response, though its probability remains low.
By the end of 2025, the Lebanese government and LAF are expected to expand their efforts to confront Hezbollah and dismantle its bases, in line with commitments already made. Israel may accompany this process by conducting targeted strikes against major Hezbollah violations, while avoiding interference with Lebanese government operations.
In every scenario, the position of the international system must be considered – first and foremost that of the United States, which will determine how far Israel can move beyond the ceasefire framework. Equally important is Iran, whose support for Hezbollah could shift the balance. The unresolved tensions between Israel and Iran remain a factor, and Tehran is known for its patience in waiting for the right moment to respond.
Lessons learned
For Israel, any chosen course of action must be guided by the lessons of the past two years.
No military campaign alone will topple Hezbollah, despite such claims already voiced by senior officials and local leaders. Even the most successful military operation, if not paired with a political initiative, risks squandering its gains and diluting achievements. The critical question is whether these lessons have truly been absorbed and internalized.
In recent weeks, Hezbollah’s leader has escalated threats and rhetoric, signaling a growing likelihood of another round of confrontation with Israel. The dynamics between the sides have shifted, and the reality on the ground points toward renewed conflict.
The next clash will not resemble the last war. Hezbollah’s strength has evolved, the balance of power has shifted, the international environment has changed, and Israel’s doctrine on the use of force has been recalibrated.
None of these factors promise an easier or shorter confrontation; rather, they point to a fundamentally different conflict, fought under new conditions and rules of engagement.
The coming weeks will reveal whether these tensions crystallize into open hostilities, and how both sides adapt to the altered strategic landscape.
We will have to wait and see.
The author is a former Israel Air Defense Forces Commander