Israel’s two-year Gaza war nears its end, but questions of victory remain - analysis

Despite President Trump's speeches during his visit to Israel and the leaders' summit in Egypt, it remains premature to declare an end to the war in Gaza or to conflicts in other arenas.

This explains the increase in rocket launches over the past two weeks, including a barrage of five rockets toward the city of Ashdod on the evening of Yom Kippur (an unusual event relative to the context of the war). It also accounts for the uptick in incidents involving encounters with militants and small cells in the field.

The presence of IDF forces across a significant part of the Gaza Strip sustains a high level of friction with both the local population and with Hamas militants. This friction creates a volatile environment, with a high potential for tactical clashes that could escalate into broader confrontations.

The question of how to decisively defeat a terrorist organization remains unresolved. Unlike conventional wars between states, where victory can be clearly defined.

In the 1973 war, Israel achieved a decisive outcome: the encirclement of Egypt’s 3rd Army in Sinai, the IDF’s crossing of the Suez Canal and advance to within 100 kilometers of Cairo, and in Syria, Israel reached about 40 kilometers from Damascus. A threat to the capital cities was the decisive turning point in the war.

The current situation in the war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip is different.

For two years, Israel has moved from one strategic milestone to another: beginning with the occupation of Khan Yunis (hometown of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar), followed by control of the Philadelphi Route, and then the entry into Rafah that we once believed was the key to Hamas’s collapse. Gaza City stood as the final stronghold, with over 80% of the Gaza Strip under IDF control. Yet despite these gains, Hamas has not been defeated, it hasn’t been eliminated, and it continues to resist militarily while hardening its stance in negotiations, including its refusal to align with supporters of the Trump Plan.

Since the outset of the war, one persistent question has been: what constitutes a military victory? This dilemma reveals a tension between the political leadership’s strategic intentions and the military’s operational execution.

The military operates according to clearly defined objectives, which it translates into missions and military operations. Achieving the objectives as defined by the political leadership will be considered a military victory. In the context of the war in Gaza, this means the dismantling of Hamas’ governing and military capabilities, alongside the release of the hostages.

Military victories have traditionally been defined by tangible achievements on the battlefield—quantifiable metrics such as the destruction of enemy capabilities, the demolition of infrastructure, and the number of enemy combatants killed. In wars between states, these benchmarks are much clearer. But when a state fights against a terrorist organization, the lines blur. Who exactly is the enemy? Is it a teenager in civilian clothing or an adult in a Hamas uniform? What constitutes terrorist infrastructure—a seemingly innocent home doubling as a weapons cache, or a tunnel hidden beneath a backyard?

This ambiguity makes the war against terrorist organizations inherently protracted-an endless war. Terror groups are adept at rebuilding itself from the ruins. The cycle is simple and self-perpetuating: today’s youth, shaped by the organization’s worldview, become tomorrow’s terrorists. As a result, defining military victory in this context demands a fundamental shift in thinking and defining how to end a war, one that accounts for the asymmetric reality of modern warfare.

We must be careful not to conflate official speeches, such as those by the Chief of Staff declaring "we have won", with the actual state of affairs. These are the same proclamations we likely would have heard had President Trump unilaterally declared the war's end six months ago. Such statements are designed to shape public perception and national narrative and do not necessarily reflect the reality on the ground.

In the era of modern warfare, there are no victory pictures. True, while perception holds great significance in shaping public understanding, and the media plays an important role, those searching for iconic scenes of surrender or raised white flags will come up empty. Instead, the story of this war must be pieced together from a mosaic of moments.

If the war concludes with the release of all the remains of the 21 murdered hostages, which currently seems more distant than previously thought, and ushers in a broader regional transformation -normalization with Saudi Arabia, security arrangements with Syria and Lebanon, and the expansion of the Abraham Accords to include countries like Indonesia-then the final image will look different. It won’t be one of victory, but of the emergence of a new regional order, forged through two years of costly, multi-front warfare, from which Israel and its society may finally begin to move forward.

The tension between political or ideological beliefs and military action has always existed and will likely persist. These realms operate with different motives, distinct worldviews, and divergent conceptual frameworks. Yet there is one critical point where the two must align: the objectives of war. These goals are meant to distill the tension and offer a shared lens through which both sides interpret reality. However, when the objectives themselves are vague or open to interpretation, the definition of "victory" for each side will continue to differ.

This is precisely the situation following the conclusion of the latest chapter in the war against Hamas in the Gaza Strip. Each side views reality through its own lens, and what appears as resolution or success to one may look incomplete or even misguided to the other.