Voters for Israel’s opposition right-wing and centrist parties are often portrayed as an incoherent coalition united by a single sentiment: opposition to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. “Anyone but Netanyahu,” the argument goes.
Yet the findings of the 2026 Foreign Policy Index, conducted by the Mitvim Institute in cooperation with the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, reveal that the core electorate of a potential “government of change” – supporters of Yasher!, Together, and Yisrael Beytenu – is motivated not merely by opposition to Netanyahu himself, but by opposition to Netanyahu’s policies.
More importantly, these voters share a clear aspiration: the prospect of a government that would deliver genuine policy change, both in relations with the Palestinians and in rebuilding Israel’s standing in the Arab world.
These findings challenge one of the most entrenched assumptions in Israeli politics. The prevailing wisdom holds that any future government dominated by the Right and Center-Right opposition parties would avoid major diplomatic initiatives.
Like the Bennett-Lapid government before it, it would seek not to “rock the boat,” certainly not on issues such as peace negotiations or a Palestinian state.
Indeed, the reluctance of leaders such as Gadi Eisenkot, Avigdor Liberman, and Yair Lapid to address the Palestinian issue stems at least partly from the belief that speaking about peace would drive voters into the Netanyahu-Smotrich camp.
But the survey points in precisely the opposite direction. It is this specific electorate that supports diplomatic initiatives, and that has shown a willingness – surprising, some would say – to make far-reaching compromises in pursuit of peace with the Palestinians.
Support for a demilitarized Palestinian state
The findings are particularly striking when voters are asked about concrete diplomatic initiatives. Nearly two-thirds of opposition voters on the Center-Right support a package deal that includes the establishment of a demilitarized Palestinian state as part of a broader regional normalization process, alongside the removal of Hamas from power in Gaza.
Almost half of Together and Yasher! voters support Trump’s 20-point plan, including its pathway to establishing a Palestinian state, while fewer than a quarter oppose it.
The desire for change is equally evident regarding Gaza. More than 60% of Together and Yasher! voters believe that defeating Hamas requires creating an alternative governing structure in Gaza or deploying a multinational force to oversee the demilitarization of the Strip.
Fewer than 20% support renewing the war and reoccupying Gaza. More than 70% regard Gaza’s reconstruction as an Israeli national interest and believe Israel should either assist or actively participate in that process.
Even on the most politically charged question – the preferred long-term solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – the two-state solution within a regional framework emerges as the leading option among Together, Yasher!, and Yisrael Beytenu voters.
Roughly half of Together and Yasher! voters support such a framework, while fewer than one-fifth support annexation of the territories.
Only one-quarter support continuing the current policy of conflict management. This is a remarkable finding, especially considering that Naftali Bennett himself became the leading advocate of the “shrinking the conflict” approach during his premiership.
More than two-thirds of opposition center-right voters see diplomatic tools – strengthening the Lebanese government and increasing regional and international pressure – as the most effective strategy for disarming Hezbollah. Fewer than one-quarter support continued Israeli military pressure as the primary course of action.
Similarly, more than half of Together and Yasher! voters believe, in retrospect, that withdrawing from the Iran nuclear agreement was a mistake, compared with fewer than one-fifth who believe it was the right decision.
Moreover, these voters assign much greater importance to Israel’s regional relationships than coalition voters do.
More than 60% support practical compromises on the Palestinian issue, including dismantling illegal outposts in the West Bank, in exchange for normalization with Saudi Arabia. An overwhelming majority views restoring relations with Jordan after the recent crisis as a top priority for the next government.
Opposition center-right voters therefore differ sharply and consistently from their counterparts in the governing coalition, whose positions on these issues are often almost the mirror image. The 2026 Index thus sharpens a trend we identified in our previous survey eight months ago. It suggests that the traditional categories of Right, Center, and Left are no longer sufficient to explain the core views of the Israeli electorate.
Instead, the main divide increasingly runs between what we termed the “super-Spartans” – staunch supporters of Netanyahu and his worldview – and the rest of Israeli society, including many voters who continue to identify as right-wing or center-right.
When Democratic voters are added to the picture, the electorate of a potential government of change appears willing to support a significant policy initiative on the Israeli-Palestinian front, whatever the government’s eventual composition.
It also reflects a broader shift in thinking about the role of diplomacy in Israel’s strategic conduct. Together, these voters could provide the next government with a clear mandate to pursue such a course and become not only a government of electoral change, but also one of genuine policy change.
There is another important message in the survey for leaders of the change camp.
We tend to describe Israel’s electoral reality as frozen – relatively rigid, with only limited movement between the blocs that support or oppose the government. Yet one of the most striking findings of the 2026 Index is the large share of respondents who have yet to develop a clear position on key questions concerning Israel’s security and foreign policy.
More than one-quarter of the public has yet to develop a clear position on Israel’s preferred strategy in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and nearly one-third remain undecided about Trump’s 20-point plan. Similar proportions remain undecided on sanctions related to settlements and on Israel’s policy toward the regime in Damascus led by Ahmed al-Sharaa.
This may indicate that Israeli society is in the midst of a transition: the public increasingly recognizes the limitations of old paradigms, yet has not fully embraced a new one. At the same time, it suggests that leaders of the change camp still have considerable room to shape public opinion on key issues – both before the elections and, perhaps, after them.
The writer is CEO of the Mitvim Institute.