The Iranian front appeared to be heating up as of last week, with the United States seeking to break Iran's blockade of the Strait of Hormuz and Tehran responding with missile fire against the United Arab Emirates and Oman.
The US tried to achieve two things that Iran did not want, and could not, accept. The first was to ease Iranian pressure in the Strait of Hormuz. There was a good chance Iran would have agreed to this if its concession had been met with an American concession, namely lifting the US blockade on Iranian oil exports. A unilateral concession would amount to defeat and even humiliation, something a Shi'ite leader cannot accept.
The second thing the US demanded, as a condition for regulating maritime traffic in the Gulf, was that Iran agree in advance to effectively give up its nuclear program. Iran's situation is difficult, but not desperate, so it was clear that it would not agree.
To force Iran to confront the need to make a decision, the US insisted on breaking the blockade in Hormuz by sending two cargo ships through. Iran acted cleverly. It avoided attacking the US Navy but fired missiles at the UAE and Oman, effectively causing flights to Dubai to be suspended and putting the ball back in the American court.
The US appears to have prepared for this scenario, so it is reasonable to expect an American military response, perhaps a measured one, but the process of escalation now appears almost inevitable.
Of course, the US could back down and reach a simple agreement with Iran, the essence of which would be lifting one blockade in return for lifting the other. Iran would relinquish its ambition to exercise exclusive control over the Strait of Hormuz and decide which ships may pass through and which may not, while the US would lift its blockade.
Most countries around the world, led by Japan, China, India, European countries, and the Gulf states, would be prepared to accept such an agreement. It would immediately cause oil prices to fall sharply. But US President Donald Trump appears to have crossed the point at which he can agree to such a significant concession.
What would escalation between the US and Iran look like for Israel?
Escalation in the Gulf would not necessarily involve Israel. The Iranians understand that striking the Gulf states and their oil industries would be far more painful than renewing their missile attacks on Israel. Of course, the IDF must be fully prepared for the alternative scenario as well.
In that case, as always, the question arises of who made better use of the roughly month-long ceasefire to improve its readiness, us or Iran. Let us hope it was us.
Israel's war in Lebanon against Hezbollah
Something strange and troubling has happened on the Lebanese front over the past month. When Iran and the US agreed to a ceasefire, Israel wanted to continue the war against Hezbollah without interruption. The Americans forced us to stop.
Had a complete ceasefire actually been maintained in Lebanon, such a scenario would also have had advantages. But Hezbollah ostensibly committed to a ceasefire while continuing to attack IDF troops. Unfortunately, some of these attacks have been extremely painful.
The US ostensibly wanted calm to be maintained in Lebanon so as not to provoke the Iranians into resuming fire, but this is a fiction. The Iranians have not resumed fire, at least until now, because they still want to avoid a massive American attack.
Under these circumstances, it is strange that Israel has not convinced the US that fighting in Lebanon, including in the Beirut sector, does not endanger any genuine American interest.
It is true that the most significant challenge at present is defense against drones, but fighting at a low intensity does not really hurt Hezbollah and does not push it toward a willingness to reach a ceasefire. Only massive strikes throughout Lebanon, particularly in Beirut, can be effective.
Israel could continue striking command centers in Beirut's Dahiyeh, the residences of Hezbollah operatives, the organization's economic assets, and anything else that hurts Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem, but we are not doing so.
Gaza is no longer a significant threat to Israel
Then there is the third front, Gaza. It is true that Hamas is trying to rebuild its strength, and it is true that it has improved its civilian control, but the Gaza front does not currently pose a significant threat to Israel.
As long as Israel controls half of the Gaza Strip and the IDF is free to strike Hamas operatives, this is a stable situation. If Gaza were the only front, it would presumably be right to adopt a more offensive approach.
But as long as the Iranian and Lebanese fronts remain "open," and as long as large numbers of troops must be allocated to the West Bank, it would be wrong to expand the campaign beyond what is necessary.
Israel therefore finds itself constrained in the face of Hezbollah provocations in Lebanon, while keeping Gaza as a secondary arena in a complex and turbulent regional campaign.