FOUR YEARS after the heady days of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, the balance sheet in the Arab world is overwhelmingly negative. Apart from Tunisia, the upheavals across the Arab Middle East and North Africa have not laid the foundations for a more hopeful future for the region's long-suffering populations – one based on new institutional arrangements founded on the rule of law, power sharing and respect for human rights. The eminent British Palestinian scholar Yezid Sayigh declared six months ago that some Arab states had reached a tipping point, or had even passed it. Indeed, Syria, Libya and Yemen have all fallen into the category of “failed” states. Recent events in Yemen – the seizure of the capital city Sanaa and dissolving of parliament by Houthi Zaydi Shi'ite rebels, following the resignation of the president Abd Rabu Mansur Hadi and his government – have further dimmed the country's prospects. There are other complicating factors as well: Iran's growing involvement, via Hezbollah, on the side of the Houthis; the specter of sectarian Shi'ite-Sunni conflict, which has become so prevalent in recent years in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon; the continuing strength of al-Qaida in portions of the country, resulting in ongoing and controversial American attacks by drone aircraft; and the possible secession by unhappy southerners. Modern Yemen, which declared its independence in 1918 following the end of Ottoman rule, has always been a fragile state marked by an unstable balance of forces between competing tribes, religious sects and political factions. Prior to 1962, it was governed by a Zaydi imamate that was largely isolated from the outside world. A military coup and Egyptian intervention on the side of the revolutionaries plunged the country into a bloody five-year civil war that was also a proxy conflict between radical pan-Arab Egypt and conservative, monarchical Saudi Arabia. The imamate was never restored, but the withdrawal of Egyptian troops allowed the Saudis to breathe easier, as it marked the end of Gamal Abdel Nasser's ambitions in Arabia. Yemen would remain a poor and internally fragmented society, governed since 1978 by Col. Ali Abdullah Saleh. Who are the Houthis? They began as a Zaydi religious revival movement in the northern regions in reaction to government neglect and the increasing penetration of Sunni Salafi influences. Beginning in 2004, they engaged in periodic violent confrontation with the state authorities. Officially known as “Ansar Allah” or “Followers of God,” the name “Houthi” derives from their leader, the charismatic cleric Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi, who died in fighting in 2004. The Houthis seized the strategic opening provided by the antiregime protests that broke out in 2011, playing an active role in the confrontations that ultimately led to Saleh's forced resignation in 2012, brokered by Gulf Arab mediators. While international and regional attention was focused on Saleh's future, the Houthis, al-Qaida aligned tribes, and southern separatists all took advantage of the Yemeni military's splintering to fill the resulting power vacuum in their respective areas. The Houthis consolidated their control in the north, and promoted an inclusive narrative of justice for all Yemenis and rejection of the old regime's corrupt practices. Their anti-establishment posture appealed to many and others aligned with them because they shared common enemies within the labyrinth of Yemeni politics. But not everyone was convinced, and suspected that their official declarations concealed more naked ambitions to restore Zaydi preeminence in the country and that their growing military prowess was being fueled by Iran and its Lebanese ally, Shi'ite Hezbollah. Some Zaydis also feared that the alliance with Iran was leading the Houthis to abandon their version of the Shi'ite creed in favor of Iran's. In any case, as the Houthis grew in strength, they became less monolithic, making it even more difficult to discern their intentions. In January 2014, a UN-sponsored National Dialogue Conference involving all of Yemen's main factions and parties announced the outlines of a six-region federal framework to govern the country. But the devil was in the details. The proposed northern region was bereft of economic assets the Houthis were keen on acquiring. Moreover, they insisted on having a role in all national institutions, including the security services. The status of the restless southern region was also unresolved. Frustrated with the continuing stalemate, the Houthis pressed their advantage, taking control of Sanaa in September 2014, ultimately compelling the president and government to resign and dissolving the parliament. The US, British and French Embassies have closed down. The current picture is anything but clear. While some Yemeni officials supported the Houthi plans for new transitional governing institutions, others denounced the Houthi actions as a coup. UN mediators rushed to Sanaa to seek agreement between the parties, and the senior Houthi leader in Sanaa proclaimed a desire to share power with the country's other main actors. Indeed, governing alone was probably beyond the Houthis' capacity. But mutual trust was in short supply, and without it, Yemen's disintegration seemed closer than ever. The author is a Principal Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University
