High Court questions factual basis of petition against UNRWA restrictions

“Our position at this stage is that the petition does not meet the initial threshold of showing harm to any particular individual,” Justice Ofer Grosskopf said at the end of the hearing. “I suggest that counsel withdraw the petition. We are not requesting a response.”

Attorney Suhad Bishara, representing the petitioners, asked for 10 days to give the court an answer. The petition has therefore not been withdrawn or dismissed, and the court did not rule on the constitutionality of the legislation.

The amendment expanded enforcement powers, including the disconnection of utilities from properties used by UNRWA and measures concerning specific sites.

Monday’s hearing centered almost entirely on whether the petitioners had submitted evidence of the practical harm they said the legislation had caused.

Grosskopf repeatedly asked Bishara to identify an updated affidavit from a particular person explaining what assistance they had received before the laws took effect, what had changed afterward and how that change had infringed a protected right.

Bishara argued that the laws had damaged a social, medical and humanitarian safety net relied upon by vulnerable Palestinians in east Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza. She said the end of official cooperation with UNRWA had affected the agency’s ability to distribute medicines and maintain assistance, including free medication and food support.

She referred to one petitioner from Shuafat refugee camp who has chronic medical conditions and said he was no longer receiving medication previously provided through UNRWA.

Grosskopf responded that the court could not establish that fact from statements made orally by an attorney. The amended petition, he said, did not include an updated affidavit documenting the alleged change after the legislation took effect.

“How do you expect us, as a court that lives from the facts brought before it, to rule without bringing us one person who comes to court and says that his situation is worse as a result?” Grosskopf asked.

Grosskopf also distinguished between harm to UNRWA as an organization and an infringement of the constitutional rights of the residents represented in the case.

UNRWA’s ability to operate had clearly been reduced, he said, but the agency was not before the court claiming rights of its own. The petitioners therefore had to show that the restrictions had caused an actual deterioration in services received by particular people and that the deterioration infringed a protected right.

The state argued that alternative arrangements and aid mechanisms remained available, and that individual enforcement complaints belonged in separate administrative proceedings rather than a challenge to the laws.

Grosskopf referred to the state’s position that basic services remained available through state authorities, the Palestinian Authority or other mechanisms. Without contrary evidence, he said, the court could not find a constitutionally significant deterioration.

Justice Yechiel Kasher described proof of a post-legislation injury as the petitioners’ necessary “entry ticket” to the broader constitutional case.

The court had not been shown even initial evidence from a person explaining that they previously received a service through UNRWA, lost it or received less after the legislation, and consequently suffered an infringement of a basic right, he said.

Kasher added that even if the petitioners crossed that threshold, they would still face further legal questions before the court could consider striking down the laws.

The bench was also skeptical that reducing assistance from the level previously supplied through UNRWA to the ordinary level of public services would automatically violate human dignity.

Kasher asked whether providing a Shuafat resident with the same services available to a Petah Tikva resident could itself amount to a human-rights violation merely because UNRWA had previously supplied more.

Bishara responded that the population served by the agency was particularly vulnerable and had received additional support because it needed it. The court could not separate the alleged reduction in assistance from the circumstances of people who depended on free medication or limited food support, she argued.

Justice Gila Canfy-Steinitz focused on whether the state had a legal obligation to cooperate with UNRWA specifically, rather than an obligation to ensure that essential services were available through the state or another body.

“Is there an obligation to receive these rights specifically from UNRWA?” she asked. “What is the legal basis for the state’s obligation to cooperate with a particular organization?”

Bishara said the provider could be UNRWA or another United Nations agency, but maintained that the laws had damaged an existing humanitarian system without ensuring sufficient alternatives.

Canfy-Steinitz said that if the claim was ultimately that the state must provide adequate health, education and welfare services, rather than that it must cooperate with UNRWA in particular, the dispute appeared closer to an administrative challenge concerning specific services.

In a statement following the hearing, Adalah accused the court of focusing on whether the state could replace UNRWA rather than addressing the petitioners’ arguments concerning Palestinian refugees’ rights under domestic and international law.

“Instead of subjecting the state’s violations to judicial scrutiny, the court’s line of questioning focused entirely on state authority and the feasibility of replacing UNRWA, culminating in a push for us to withdraw the petition,” Bishara said.

She argued that the approach signaled the court’s unwillingness to intervene in what Adalah described as an effort to dismantle UNRWA and remove protections afforded to Palestinian refugees under international law.

The hearing instead ended on the preliminary question of whether the alleged effects of the legislation had been supported by enough evidence to allow the constitutional challenge to proceed.

The petitioners now have 10 days to respond. Until then, the petition remains pending, and no final judgment has been issued.