Lawyers for more than 8,000 people seeking to hold the Palestinian Authority responsible for harm caused by the October 7 massacre and the war that followed are expected to file written arguments with the Jerusalem District Court by the end of Sunday.
The short briefs will explain why the plaintiffs believe the PA should bear civil responsibility – and potentially pay damages - for deaths, injuries and other harm caused by the attack and the ensuing war.
The filings are part of a court-ordered process examining the central question shared by thousands of lawsuits: whether the PA’s actions and policies can be tied closely enough to October 7 for it to be held responsible.
In a July 1 decision, Judge Eran Shilo set out how the cases will move forward. Each law firm representing plaintiffs was instructed to submit a brief of no more than three pages by Sunday, while the PA must file a single response by October 18.
What the decision does is bring the lawsuits together for the shared question of responsibility, while leaving the circumstances and compensation sought by individual plaintiffs to their separate cases.
The court also set deadlines for the exchange of information. Plaintiffs’ attorneys must send written questions to the PA by August 11, and the PA must provide its answers and relevant documents by October 29.
Can the PA's conduct be connected to the massacre?
Expert reports are expected to examine whether the PA’s conduct can be connected to the massacre. Shilo encouraged the plaintiffs’ lawyers to coordinate their work rather than submit numerous reports repeating the same points.
The judge also left open the possibility that the court could eventually rule on the PA’s responsibility before addressing damages in each case. He said it was too early, however, to know whether the evidence would justify doing so.
Against that backdrop, a study published Thursday by Lt.-Col. (res.) Maurice Hirsch presents one possible argument for connecting PA policy to Hamas figures involved in October 7.
Hirsch, a former director of the IDF Military Prosecution in the West Bank, examined the PA and Palestine Liberation Organization’s system of payments and benefits for Palestinian security prisoners and released prisoners, commonly known in Israel as “pay for slay.”
The comprehensive study links PA payment framework to October 7th leadership
The study argues that the system went far beyond monthly payments made while prisoners were behind bars. Based on PA legislation and regulations, Hirsch describes a broader framework that included grants upon release, preferential or guaranteed employment in PA institutions, and continuing payments when no position was available.
According to the study, the rank and salary offered to a released prisoner were tied in part to the length of time he had spent in prison. It points in particular to regulations adopted in 2013 under which released prisoners who had served more than 10 years were to be employed and paid by PA institutions.
The study highlights a provision stating that those employed under the arrangement had to report for work only when asked to do so. Hirsch argues that the system could therefore provide experienced terrorists with a continuing income without requiring them to hold an ordinary job, leaving them free to resume Hamas activity.
The study does not claim that the payment system alone caused the October 7 massacre, or that every person who received benefits later returned to terrorism. Hirsch instead argues that the financial support reduced the personal and economic cost of terrorist activity and assisted former prisoners who later became senior Hamas figures or took part in planning, financing, or carrying out the attack.
Much of the study focuses on Palestinians released in the 2011 exchange for kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit. Israel freed 1,027 prisoners in the deal, including Yahya Sinwar and others who later rose through Hamas’s political, military, security and financial ranks.
According to the study, the PA subsequently allocated USD 5 million in grants for those released, including prisoners sent to Gaza or expelled abroad. Hirsch also writes that the PA later changed its rules to ensure that expelled prisoners could qualify for employment and salary benefits.
The study cites Sinwar, who had spent more than 22 years in Israeli prison before becoming Hamas’s leader in Gaza and a principal architect of the massacre. Hirsch argues that the length of Sinwar’s imprisonment would have qualified him for a senior PA position and corresponding salary under the regulations.
The study makes similar arguments regarding Rouhi Mushtaha, a senior Hamas official and close associate of Sinwar; Tawfik Abu Naim, who headed Hamas’s internal-security apparatus; and Zaher Jabarin, a leading figure in Hamas’s financial network.
It also cites Ali Qadhi, a Hamas Nukhba commander who led terrorists into Israel on October 7. Based on the prison term identified in the study, Hirsch argues that Qadhi would at least have qualified for a fixed payment under the PA rules.
For those figures, however, the study mainly seeks to establish that the payment mechanism was available to them under the PA’s regulations. It does not publish individual records showing precisely what each man received or whether payments continued until the massacre.
Hirsch told The Jerusalem Post that the aim was not necessarily to prove that the Hamas figures were still being paid at the time of the attack, but to show that the mechanism through which they could be paid existed in the years leading up to October 7. That, he said, was “just as important.”
The study’s analysis could become relevant if the plaintiffs rely on the PA’s prisoner-payment and employment policies to argue that it gave long-term financial support to people who later helped lead, finance or carry out the massacre.
The plaintiffs will ultimately have to show more than the existence of the payment system. They will need to persuade the court that the PA’s conduct was connected closely enough to October 7 and the resulting harm for it to bear civil responsibility.